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THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. MABEL MALOTTE, 
Appellant. 
69 
[1] Privacy-What Oonstitutes Violation of &t,ht.-Wbeu a per-
son discusses the commission of a crime with another, face 
to face or at a distance through the use of any meaus of 
communication, there is no unreasonable invasion of privacy 
when the' other uses the conversation against him. 
(2] Telegraphs and Telephones-Crimes.- Where a conversation 
was recorded by police officers at the moment it reached the 
intended receiver, there was no interccption within the mean-
ing of the Federal Communications Act, § 605, prohibiting 
any person not authorized by the sender to intercept any eom-
munication and divulge or publish the existence, contents. 
substance, purport, effect or meaning of such intercepted 
communication to anyone. 
[S] Id.-Crimes.-There is no learning of the contents of acom-
munication "fraudulently. clandestinely, or in any other un-
authorized manner" in violation of Pen. Code, § 640, pro-
hibiting tapping or an unauthorized connection with a 
telegraph or telephone line, when one participant to the eon· 
versation consents to or directs its oyerhearing or preserva-
tion. 
[4] Oriminal La.w - Defenses - Entrapment.-Where an accused 
had a preexisting criminal intE'nt, the fact that when .olicited 
by a decoy he committed a crime raises no inference of un· 
lawful entrapment. 
[6) Id.-InBtructions-Defenses-EntrapJll,ent.-Where there is a 
complete absence of any evidence of unlawful entrapment, no 
instruction on the subjE'ct need be given. 
[1) Right of privacy, notes. 138 A.L.R. 22; 168 A.L.R. 446, 14 
A.L.R.2d 750. See also Cal.Jur. lO-Yr.Supp. (1949 Rev.), Privacy, 
§ 2; Am.Jur., Privacy, 120 et seq. 
[2) See Cal.Jur., Telegraphs and Telephones, 5 33 et seq.; Am. 
Jur., Telegraphs and Telephones, 1 65. 
[4) Entrapment to commit crime with view to punishment there· 
for, notes, 18 A.L.R. 146; 66 A.L.R. 478; 86 A.L.R. 263. See also 
Oal.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, 1200 et seq.; Am.JUl •• Criminal Law, 
§304. 
Melt. Dig. References: [lJ Privacy, 12; [2,3) Telegraphs and 
Telephones, §4;[4] Criminal Law, 550; [5] Criminal Law, §761. 
[6, 9] Conspiracy, § 5; (7] Conspiracy, § 3; [8] Criminal Law, 
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[8] Oonspfracy-Criminal- Particular Oonspiracies.-Defendant 
was Dot improperly charged with a conspiracy to violate a 
municipal police code section prohibiting an offer or agree-
ment to commit an act of prostitution on the ground that she 
could only be charged with a conspiracy to violate another 
municipal police code section prohibiting one from soliciting 
any person for the purpose of prostitution, since the two code 
sections set forth separate offenses, the first making the offer 
or agreement one's own, while the other relates to solicitation 
for another. 
[7] Id.-Criminal-Overt Act.-A conspirator does not have to 
participate in the crime conspired. 
[8] Criminal Law-Principals-Aiders and Abetters.-Conspiracy 
is not synonymous with aiding or abetting or participating; 
it implies an agreement to commit a crime, while to aid and 
abet requires actual participation in the act constituting the 
offense. 
[9] Conspiracy-Criminal- Particular Conspiracies.-Pen. Code, 
§ 182, occupies the field of conspiracy and prohibits a con-
spiracy "to commi.t any crime," and in prescribing the punish-
ment for conspiracies to commit misdemeanors, DO distinction 
is drawn between misdemeanors defined by city ordinances 
and those defined by statute. 
[10] Municipal Oorporations - Ordinances - Oonflict With Stat-
utes.-Although the Legislature can make exceptions to the 
statutes enacted by it, inferior legislative bodies cannot. 
(Const., art. XI, § 11.) 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the 
City and County of San Francisco and from an order deny-
ing a new trial. John B. Molinari, Judge. Affirmed. 
Prosecution for conspiring to commit a misdemeanor and 
for contributing to the delinquency of a minor. Judgment 
of conviction affirmed. 
Leslie C. Gillen and John R. Golden for Appellant. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Clarence A. Linn, 
Chief Assistant Attorney General, and Raymond M. Mom-
boisse, Deputy Attorney Gencral, for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Mabel Malotte appeals from a judgment 
of conviction entered on a jury verdict finding her guilty of 
conspiring to commit a misdemeanor (Pen. Code, § 182), 
and of contributing to the delinquency of a minor (Welf. 
" Inst. Code, § 702.) She also appeals from the order deny-
. iDe her motion for a new trial. 
/ 
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On March 10, 1954, Frank Lombardi, at the request of 
the police, made a telephone call from the district attorney's 
office in San Francisco. He identified himself and said, 
"Say, listen Mabel; a friend of mine will be in town tonight, 
and he will call you. His name is Leonard Windsor. Can 
you take care of him'" This telephone caU was not recorded 
and the officers present were unable to hear the party at the 
other end of the line. 
At about 8 o'clock that night Inspectors o 'Haire and 
McGuire of the San Francisco Police Department went to 
room 712 at the Sir Francis Drake Hotel, where they had 
previously registered. They placed a recording apparatus 
under one of the beds and connected it to an induction coil, 
a device designed to overhear a telephone conversation with-
out the necessity of malting physical connection with the tele-
phone electrical circuit. Inspector 0 'Haire then placed a call 
to Prospect 6-3267, and defendant answered. Their conver-
sation was as follows: 
"Hello. 
"Is this Mrs. Malotte! 
"Yes. 
"Ub-this is-uh-Leonarcl Windsor. 
"Yes. 
"Ub-Mr. Frank Lombardi told me to get in touch with 
you this evening. 
"Yes; he told me. 
"He did! 
"Yes. 
"Well, I'm staying up at-uh-Sir Franeis Drake, room 
712. 
"All right. 
"And-uh-I have my friend, Mr. Bacei. 
"Ub-no, he didn't. But I'll-I'll take care of it. What's 
the name, did you say f 
"Bacci. 
"All right. I'll-uh-what time do you want them, right 
nowf 
"Well, not right at the moment. In about an hour, half 
an hour, an hour. 
"That'l1 be fine. All right, I'll take eare of it. 
"Yes, what time shall we expect them, in half an hour, an 
hourT 
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About an hour after the telephone eall Yola Boles, a 
minor, came to the hotel room and introduced Lerself as 
Adele. The second girl failed to appear, and Yola gave the 
officers another telephone number, which they caned to ask 
about the delay. Defendant also answered this call and told 
them tbat tbe otber girl would be along in a few minutes. 
In tbe meantime, Mary Madsen, tbe other girl, thinking' 
she saw a plainclothesman following ber, called defendant 
for instructions. Defendant called tbe botel room and asked 
to speak to "Adele," but was told tbat she was occupied. 
Mary again called defendant, as sbe bad been instructed 
to do on her previous call, and was told that tbere was 
nothing wrong and to go on up. Mary, however, refused to 
enter tbe botel unescorted. Defendant told her to call the 
room and bave the customer come down to meet her. Mary 
called tbe room, asked 0 'Haire to come down, and asked him 
to call defendant. 0 'Haire made the call and was told by 
defendant, "Well, I have tbe girl on the other pbone now 
and she will meet you across the street in the Owl Drug 
Store. " None of these subsequent calls were recorded, nor 
were they overheard by anyone except the parties thereto. 
Inspector 0 'Haire met Mary at the Owl Drug Store and 
returned with her to the room. Tbe girls were paid $2!'i 
eacb. They disrobed and got into the beds. The officers 
took badges from their luggage, identified themselves as of. 
ficers, and placed the girls under arrest. Tben they went to 
defendant's apartment and waited outside overnight until 
a warrant could be secured for her arrest. When they securec'l 
the warrant, tbey demanded admittance, explained their 
purpose, and forced the door when she refused to answer 
(See Pen. Code, § 844.) Tbey found ber hiding in the attic. 
Defendant contends that the evidence of the recorded phont' 
call was inadmissible on the ground that it was obtained in 
violation of her constitutional rigbts and in violation of 
federal and California statutes. She maintains that with· 
out the interpretation the recorded call gives to the sub· 
sequent transactions no conspiracy is established, leavintr in· 
admissible tbe extrajudicial acts and declarations of tbe girls. 
alleged coconspirators, and uncorroborated Mary's testimony, 
; 
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prostitute for her. 
The attorney general, relying on Olmstead v. United 8ItJl68, 
277 U.S. 438 [48 8.Ct. 564, 72 L.Ed. 944, 66 A.L.R. 376], and 
Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 [62 S.Ot. 993, 86 
hEd. 1322], contends that the overhearing of the telephone 
conversation by means of the induction coil was not a search 
and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment 
to the Constitution of the United States and article I, section 
19, of the California Constitution. It is unnecessary to de-
termine whether those cases have been unsettled by lrt!ine 
v. California, 347 U.S. 128 [74 8.Ct. 381, 98 L.Ed. 561], for 
there is a basic difference between the conduct of the officers 
in that case and the conduct of Inspectors 0 'Haire and 
McGuire, herein. In the Irvine case there were several tres-
passes when the microphone was installed and subsequently 
moved in the Irvine home, and an "incredible" invasion of 
the right to privacy through the .eavesdropping over the 
microphone. The officers monitored indiscriminately not only 
the conversations pertaining to gambling, but those involving 
every phase of the Irvine's personal affairs. The technique 
used by the officers made selectivity impossible. In the pres-
ent case there was neither trespass nor indiscriminate eaves-
dropping. Unlike the Irvine case, nothing was overheard 
but the free discussion of a crime by one who thought her 
listener a client. [1] When a person discusses the com-
mission of a crime with another, face to face or at a distance 
through the use of any mf'.aDS of communication, there is no 
unreasonable invasion of privacy when the other uses the 
conversation against him. 
Defendant contends, however, that the evidence was ob-
tained in violation of the Federal Communications Act (47 
U.S.C.A. § 605), and section 640 of the California Penal Code 
and that it was, therefore, inadmissible under the rule of 
People v. Cahan,44 Ca1.2d 434 [282 P.2d 905]. 
Section 605 of the Federal Communications Act provides: 
". . . no person not being authorized by the sender shall 
intercept any communication and divulge or publish the 
existence, contents, substance, purport, effect or meaning 
of such intercepted communication to any person; ... " A 
majority of the federal courts define "intercept" as used in 
section 605 to mean "to take or seize by'the way, or before 
arrival at the destined place," and hold that there is no inter-
ception when the iutended receiver consents to or directs the 
64 [46 C.2d 
overhearing of the communication at the moment it reaches 
him. (United States v. Yee Ping Jong, 26 F.Supp. 69, 70; 
United States v. Lewis, 87 F.Supp, 970, 973, reversed on 
other grounds suo nom. Billeci v. United States, 184 F.2d 394; . 
United States v. Sullivan, 116 F.Supp. 480, 482 j United States. 
Y. Pierce, 124 F.Supp. 264, 267; and see dissent of Clark, J. to 
United States v. Polakoff, 112 F.2d 888, 891; ct. United 
Stales v. Polakoff, supra, 112 F.2d 888, 889 j United States v. 
StcphensO'll, 121 F.Supp. 274, 277.) The United States Su-
preme Court, approving this definition in the Goldman case, 
supra, 316 U. S. 129, 134, went on to say: "[Intercept] does 
not ordinarily connote the obtaining of what is to be sent 
before, or at the moment, it leaves the possession of the pro-
posed sender, or after, or at the moment, it comes into the 
possession of the intended receiver." (See Reitmeister v. 
Reitmeister, 162 F.2d 691.) [2] Thus, as in the present. 
case, where the conversation was recorded by the officers" at 
the moment" it reached the "intended receiver," there was 
no interception within the meaning of section 605 of the 
Federal Communications Act. [3] There was likewise no 
invasion of privacy in violation of section 640 of the Penal 
Code.1 There is no learning of the contents of a communica-
tion "fraudulently, clandestinely, or in any other unauthor-
ized manner" when one of the participants to the conversation 
consents to or directs its overhearing or preservation. (See 
People v. Channel, 107 Ca1.App.2d 192, 200 [236 P.2d 654].) 
Defendant complains that the trial court erred in refusing 
to instruct the jury on the defense of entrapment. A sub-
stantial part of the conversation between Frank Lombardi 
and defendant, and all of that between Inspector 0 'Haire 
and defendant is quoted above. Neither conversation, nor 
any testimony brought' out at the trial by defendant or the 
People shows more than the creation of an opportunity for 
defendant to act on her preexisting criminal intent. 
[4] "Where an accused has a preexisting criminal intent, 
"'Ever,y person who, by means of any machine, instrument, or eon· 
trlvanee, or in an,. other maDDer, willfully and fraudulently, or elan· 
destinely taps, or makes any wiautborized eonneetion with any telegraph 
or telephone wire, line, eable, or instrument under the eontrol of any 
telegraph or telephone company; or who willfully and fraudulently, or 
clandestinely, or in any other unauthorized maDDer, reads, or attempts 
to read, or to learn the contents or meaning of any message, report, or 
eo=unication while the same is in transit or passing over any tele-
graph or telephone wire, line, or cable, or is being sent from, or 
reeeivecl at any plaee within this State ••• , ia punishable [b1 fine and 
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the fact that when solicited by a decoy he committed a crime 
raises no inference of unlawful entrapment." (PeopZe ... 
Schwartz, 109 Oal.App.2d 450, 455 [240 P.2d 1024], quoted 
with approval in PeopZe v. Braddock, 41 Oal.2d 794,802 [264 
P.2d 521].) [5] Thus, as in this case, where there is a 
complete absence of any evidence of unlawful entrapment, no 
instruction on the subject need be given. (People v. Alamillo, 
113 Oal.App.2d 617, 621 [248 P.2d 421] ; People v. Ja.ck.on, 
106 Oal.App.2d 114, 125 [234 P.2d 766]; People v. Bt14"ris, 
80 Oal.App. 328, 331 [251 P. 823].) 
[6] Defendant also contends that even if we admit the 
evidence to which she objects, the judgment must be reversed 
on the ground that she was improperly charged with a con-
spiracy to violate section 240, subdivision (a), of the Police 
Oode of San Francisco. She claims that section 2252 of the 
Police Oode defines the same offense as does section 240,· and 
IUgUes that since section 225 provides a lesser penalty, she 
can only be charged with a conspiracy to violate that section. 
The two sections set forth separate offenses. One can solicit 
for another (§ 225), but the offer or agreement to commit an 
act of prostitution is one's own. (§ 240, subd. (a).) [7] De-
fendant contends that if the sections are not the same, and 
if section 240, subdivision (a), is construed as referring to an 
act of prostitution to be committed by the one making the 
offer or agreement, the evidence shows only a conspiracy to 
violate section 225 and not section 240, subdivision (a), since 
she did not offer or agree to commit an act of prostitution. 
The answer to this contention is that a conspirator does not 
have to participate in the crime conspired. 
Finally, defendant contends that the felony charge was 
improper and that she should have been sentenced and con-
victed for a misdemeanor only, on the ground that subsection 
(g) of section 240 of the Police Oode, 1Vhich makes it a mis-
demeanor to aid or abet or participate in the doing of any of 
the acts prohibited by section 240, should be construed as 
prohibiting a conspiracy to violate section 240. [8] Con-
spiracy', however, is not synonymous with aiding or abetting 
or participating. Conspiracy implies an agreement to commit 
a crime; to aid and abet requires actual participation in the 
lI'It maD be 1Dllawful tor RD7 pellOD on RD7 public atreet or ~hwa7 
or elaewhere, to lolicit, 117 word, act, gesture, knock. 81m or other-
wille, Ill)' person tor the purpoae of prostitution." 
"'Eve17 pelIOn 11 cuiltJ of • miademeanor who: (.) OfreJ'll • ~ 
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act constituting the offense. (People v. BOM, 13 Ca1.App .• 
175 [109 P. 150].) [9] Moreover, section 182 of the Penal 
Code occupies the field of conspiracy and prohibits a conspir- i 
acy "to commit any crime." In prescribing the punishment 
for conspiracies to commit misdemeanors, no distinction is 
drawn between misdemeanors defined by city ordinance and 
those defined by statute. The case of In re Williamson, 43 
Cal.2d 651 [276 P.2d 593], holding section 7030 of the Busi- I 
ness and Professions Code, dealing with conspiracies to i 
violate certain licensing provisions of that code, to be an 
exception to the general conspiracy provisions of section 182' 
of the Penal Code, is not in point, for section 240, subdivision 
{g), of the Police Code of San Francisco cannot be considered 
such an exception. [10] Although the Legislature can make 
exceptions to the statutes enacted by it, inferior legislative 
bodies cannot. (Cal. Const., art. XI, § 11; Pipoly v. Benson, 
20 Ca1.2d 366, 370 [125 P.2d 482, 147 A.L.R. 515], and cases 
cited therein.) Thus, defendant was properly charged with 
and convicted of a felony. 
The judgment and order are affirmed. 
Shenk, J., Spence. J., and McComb, J., concurred. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
I am of the opinion that the judgment should be reversed 
for failure to instruct the jury on the defense of entrapment. 
There is evidence in the record which would support a verdict 
based on that defense. The police officers induced Frank 
Lombardi, a friend of defendant, to solicit her to commit the 
criminal act here involved. 
The police officer involved in the entrapment testified: 
"Q. You, either alone or with the assistance of someone 
else conceived the idea of setting into motion a set of circum-
stances to cause someone to eommit a crime, iBn't that 
correcU • . • A. Yes." 
After the solicitation by Lombardi the police officers posed 
as decoys and made further solicitation of defendant whi'cb .:. 
culminated in the consummation of the crime. The jury could I 
have concluded that the police originated and set in motion a 
scheme to cause defendant to commit a crime. This could be 
interpreted to mean that regardless of the innocent or guilty 
frame of mind of the victim, the police sought to cause her to 
commit a crime. This purpose was carried out, the first step 
being a telephone call by Lombardi to defendant asking her 
to violate the law. In Cline v. United Stat6l, 20 F.2d 494, 
/ 
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defendant procured a narcotic for a dope addict upon the 
Ilolicitation of the latter whom be knew and who was acting 
in fear of the police in making the solicitation. The court 
held there was entrapment as a matter of law. In United 
States v. Eman Mfg, Co., 271 F. 353, the government agent, 
pretending to be a customer for defendant's medicinal prod. 
uct, "Su1£ox," wrote to defendant asking it to send bim 
some. Defendant did so but misbranded the Su1£ox which 
constituted a violation of the food and drug laws when the 
article was placed in interstate commerce. The court held 
there was entrapment. In People v. Gallagher, 107 Cal.App. 
425 [290 P. 504], the officers had Dan, an addict and seller 
of drugs, solicit defendant, an addict, to buy drugs. The 
drug was left on the street, and, at DaB's request, defendant 
paid for it and picked it up whereupon he was arrested for 
illegal possession. The judgment of conviction was reversed 
for failure to instruct on entrapment, the court stating 
(p. 429): "It must be borne in mind that appellant was not 
charged with having sold or bargained to sen any drugs; nor 
was any evidence whatever introduced to show that such was 
his intention. The present case, therefore, is quite different 
from those upon which respondent seems to rely, showing that 
a defendant was already in the illegal possession of an article. 
but was entrapped into selling it. In the case at bar the 
theory of appellant's defense was that the possession by him 
of said drug was brought about solely through the instru-
mentalities of the state's agent and those working under him. 
for the very purpose of causing his arrest. As said in the 
case of In re Moore, 70 Cal.App. 483 [233 P. 805, 806], 'It 
may be conceded that it would be violative of sound public 
policy and repugnant to good morals to uphold the conviction 
of a person who, being entirely innocent of any intention to 
commit a crime, was inveigled into its commission by an 
officer of the law or by a private detective hired for that 
purpose by some self-constituted guardian of the public 
morals. (People v. Barkdoll, 36 Cal.App. 25 [171 P. 440].)' .. 
My views on entrapment were expressed in my dissent in 
People v. Braddock, 41 CaJ.2d 794. 803 r264 P.2d 521]. 
For the foregoing reason 1 would reverse the judgment. 
Schauer, J., concurred. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied February 
21, 1956. Carter, J., and Schauer, J., were of the opinion 
that the petition should be granted. 
I 
